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Abstract 
Designers often explain new concepts and new ideas by reference to existing designs. This is 
parsimonious, as it only requires a pointer to the referent and a description of the 
modifications. Such descriptions can be extremely powerful, expressing the entire context of a 
design or a process in a few words. However similarity assertions are inherently ambiguous, 
because they depend not only on the chosen description but also on the intention behind the 
similarity comparison. In this paper we attempt to analyse the effect that the ambiguity of 
similarity references has on communication and idea generation in design. The 
reinterpretation of a similarity assertion can be extremely creative, where ambiguity allows 
for new interpretations of a problem. At the same time, it can make accurate communication 
extremely difficult because every assertion can be interpreted differently unless the context is 
fully shared.  
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1 Introduction 
When designers talk to each other, they frequently make reference to other designs that they 
have been involved in or that all are familiar with. This is entirely normal for members of a 
group that shares context – awareness of a range of other designs. But the same conversation 
can be very bewildering for novices or outsiders like design researchers. The common 
references and objects of discussion give the group a sense of cohesion. At the same time 
talking in references is a very powerful way of communicating. Instead of describing 
something accurately it is sufficient to refer to an object and the intended modification [1]. 
Moreover some concepts can only be expressed by naming exampls, because the range of 
object or feature categories exceeds the available names, nd they cannot easily be described 
in terms of their structures [1, 17]. 
For example, designers discussing a diesel engine may say “we use the same arrangement of 
the cylinder head assembly as on the new 4 cylinder engin  for the 6 cylinder engine”. This 
makes perfect sense to an insider explaining exactly the layout of the cylinder head assembly, 
fuel injection points and so on. For an outsider this is baffling. What did they mean by new 
engine? How is the cylinder head assembly arranged? What does this mean for the fuel 
injection? What does it mean for the pistons? However on closer inspection the implication of 
the statement might not be clear for an insider either. The new design will clearly inherit more 
than just the location of the cylinder head, but which of the design decisions that follow from 
this are kept? Maybe the speaker meant really just where t y wanted to put the cylinder head 
assembly, whereas the listener concluded that naturally this must mean the fuel injection 
system as well. At the same time the listener is reminded of the reference object and thinks 
about the 4-cylinder engine. This might remind him that this engine had a very elegant 
solution  or the location of the high pressure fuel pipes and he proceeds to think about fuel 
pipes, missing half the conversation about engine heads but coming closer to the solution to 
his problem. So communicating by reference to objects is ambiguous. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the ways in which the ambiguity in similarity assertions 
can lead to misunderstandings in communicating by referenc . Our aim is to provide part of a 
conceptual toolkit for understanding design communication in a wide variety of situations as 
well as a wide variety of industries. This paper concentrates on the similarity references made 
in conversations between expert designers – between the people who share knowledge and 
understanding of the objects they refer to. Novices and outsiders apply the same cognitive 
processes to different knowledge, to interpret similarity references differently. The argument 
presented in the paper is based on our observations of deign interactions and design meetings 
in several large engineering companies, where we studied change, planning and 
communication behaviour in complex organisations [2]. In a separate study [3, 5] we have 
looked at the nature of ambiguity and its effects on asynchronous communication through 
writing and sketching. In some situations ambiguity can have a ry detrimental effect. We 
have observed ambiguous descriptions of designs having very harmful effects in the knitwear 
industry, which we have studied in great detail [4, 9]. The structu e of similarity, its 
description, and implications for complexity in design are subject of ongoing research [6, 7, 
8].  
2 Design Discussions 
In the complex engineering products, such as diesel engin s, we have studied, the generation 
of solution concepts or details is often a solitary activity interspersed with meetings. 
Somebody defines a problem, it is discussed in a meeting, everybody goes away and thinks 
about it, and discussions are held as required. Then at a subsequent project meeting each 
designer presents one or more solutions to the problem alocated to them. Meetings are 
important for evaluating and making decisions about relativey w ll-developed proposals [12]. 
This is quite different to the relatively uncommon design situations that are frequently 
analysed by researchers [10, 11], where a group of designers is given a design task and kept 
together until the problem is solved or the time is up.  
Some of the meetings we have observed were convened as change meetings, where a creative 
solution to a problem needed to be found quickly before an mergent change could upset the 
design schedule [2]. In these meetings designers reported on their progress and brought open 
issues to the discussion, that were sometimes resolved in the meeting or actioned for 
following meetings. The meetings fulfilled several functions at once: (a) inform other 
participants of the progress of the design and alert themo future issues; (b) negotiate the key 
parameters of the system and agree interfaces between different components; (c) specify tasks 
for other people; and (d) jointly design solutions for specific problems. Meetings slip fluidly 
between these different functions. When designers are specifying or negotiating for a 
mutually acceptable design decision, their utterances have quit  different intentions to those 
they make when jointly developing design ideas. They are s ying “my situation is X, what is 
yours?” or “I want X, make sure you have it ready by Monday” or “I need 4mm clearance, 
you only leave me 2mm. What shall we do?” In these situations they want to be understood 
clearly and express themselves unambiguously. While there will al ays be an element of 
negotiating for a shared understanding, with room for discussion  arising from ambiguity, as 
Bucciarelli points out [12], ambiguity is not desired.  
Communication is rather different when designers are dev loping designs together, especially 
for early conceptual design, where design ideas are typically vague, provisional, imprecise 
and incomplete. Such situations have been extensively studied from a variety of perspectives, 
primarily through experiments [see for instance 11]. In co versations for joint designing, 
sketches, gestures and words are used in combination to explicate and disambiguate each 
other [13, 14, 15, 16]. The participants in joint designing usually get rapid feedback on 
whether they have been understood (though clarification is a major activity within meetings). 
So they can interactively negotiate an understanding of each other’s positions, as well as 
negotiate about decisions, before the (provisional or imprecise) decisions are represented in 
precise-seeming forms [10]. Designers use rhetorical techniques for argumentation, including 
subtleties of phrasing and tone, to modulate the degree of b lief they express in ideas, and 
signal willingness to make trade-offs, as well as to expr ss exactitude [10, 16]. However there 
is no guarantee that all the participants will always pick up these signals. Some people use 
them badly or in idiosyncratic ways. We have observed participants disagreeing about the 
purposes of meetings, and listeners being mistaken about the function of an utterance as 
intended by the speaker. In consequence they do not recognise information that they are given 
as uncertain or provisional. The opposite possibility is that hey might interpret a specification 
wildly. 
3 The Structure of Similarity 
There are two problems in interpreting communications by reference, first determining the 
respects in which the new design suggestion is meant to be similar to the referent, and second 
determining how similar.  
3.1 Understanding similarity statements 
Psychological research has long been concerned with the roles of similarity and analogy in 
reasoning. The mechanisms involved in interpreting similarity statements and analogies 
remain an active topic of research. While similarity can be described in terms of the number 
of features shared between two items [18], similarity judgements depend crucially on which 
features are most salient when the comparisons are md [19]. What features people attend to, 
and how similar they judge two things to be, is influenced by the context – importantly what 
category both items are indicated to belong to, and what other contrasting items are also 
present for comparison. Similarity statements are intrpreted to be informative [18]. There is 
evidence that the features of the items compared are aligned, and attention is directed to the 
features each shares with only some members of the category [19]. Comparisons like “a robin 
is like a question”, where there are no category-universal features to provide a ground for 
identifying relevant features, seem peculiar. These featur s include not only simple or 
perceptible attributes, but also structural relationships between elements of the items, so that 
the recognition of shared patterns of relationships which drives analogical reasoning [20] is 
also important in the perception of similarity [21]. But even directly perceived features are 
learned from deep understanding of structure and function – f r instance what a diesel engine 
expert sees when looking at a cylinder head assembly is very different from a non-engineer – 
and mental representations of objects include behavioural characteristics as well as structure.  
For example a conceptual designer of diesel engines understands the trade-offs between heat 
and noise through the fan. The nature of this trade-off remains independent of the type of 
engine. Communication through metaphor and analogies depends on identifying 
correspondences between these abstract relational features when more concrete attributes are 
dissimilar. In design, inspiration is the unprompted recognition of such correspondences to the 
needs of a current problem – though in some industries designer  actively search for 






Figure 1 Different types of Similarity Groups 
3.2 Types of similarity relationship 
How similarity assertions are interpreted depends on how target and referent are classified 
into one category, so that the attributes shared by all category members serve to identify the 
significant attributes shared by only some category members. But the relationship between 
items and category can vary, influencing interpretation. It is possible to identify several 
distinct formal types of similarity relationship that designs can have to each other, linking 
them into subcategories of similar designs [7, 8]. Figure 1 shows some of these patterns. The 
black spots indicate common features among all designs in a population and are disregarded 
in a similarity analysis. The grey spots show the features shared by pairs of designs – the 
features that are the focus of attention in interpreting s milarity assertions. Typical patterns of 
similarity based on shared features are:  
• • Tolerance classes are groups of elements where each pair shares at least one 
common feature [23, 24, 25].  
• • Chains are groups where each pair of elements is connected by a sequence of 
elements such that neighbouring elements share at least one feature. A chain is a 
weaker similarity grouping than a tolerance class. In chains perceived similarity may 
not be based on directly shared features. Thus removing an intermediate link can alter 
perceptions of similarity, or make a reference unintelligible. Chains are significant 
when designs are linked historically through a sequence of intermediate developments. 
Knowing this may influence the features one thinks are relevant to the similarity 
assertion; not knowing this may make a reference unintelligible, or lead to it being 
taken to indicate closer similarity than is intended. The recognition of pertinent 
features can also be influenced by recollection of a chain of comparisons in previous 
discussions, which other people might have missed. 
• • Versions of the same product, or a family of closely related products, share many 
common features, while each one has additional features which do not necessarily 
have any specific relationship to each other. 
• • Ranges – such as the ranges of complementary products produced by clothing 
manufacturers – span a variety of basic categories and so do not share any common 
basic attributes beyond being objects. What ties them into a common category is more 
abstract relational features such as having complementary functions within some 
larger scheme. Usually every design is linked to others in the range through several 
shared features, giving the range its coherence. 
3.3 Instances, categories, and spaces for interpretation 
Perceived similarity relationships can change as the context for comparison changes [18]. In 
particular perceptions can shift of how different a design is from what is typical for its 
category, when new members are added to the category (Figure 2). Our interests include 
situations where designers’ mental representations of the spaces of possible designs are 
formed by remembering many different designs, recognising similar ties, and creating 
category concepts [17]. The relationship between mental repres ntations of instances and 
categories is difficult to unpick, but there is evidenc that instances are represented at least 
partly in terms of how they vary from category-typical; deviations that are recognised as 
significant are remembered and can be exaggerated, while ot er deviations are ironed out [17, 
26]. Smaller categories might be represented extensionally as aggregates of all their elements; 
so if a new element is added then it is included in the list of the elements (Figure 2(A). But for 
larger categories, representations of what is typical are primary (Figure 2(B)). A new element 
may influence this; however the representation of category-typical is not merely the average 
of all instances. For example when people are asked to draw a car, they often draw old-
fashioned saloons. In some cases the representation of category-typical may be a particularly 
important or memorable canonical example – this may be unr presentative of the range of 
instances within the category (Figure 2(C)). When similarity to reference point statements are 
interpreted, the features that are compared are their deviations from category-typical. This can 
give a skewed or asymmetric character to the similarity relationships between pairs of non-









A: Extensional represention by elements 
New elements change representation  
B: Represention by central element 
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Figure 2 New elements in Similarity Spaces 
 
When a reference is made to a unique design within a very general class, or one of a set of 
equally well-known designs, then the differences between th  referent and what is general for 
the category gives some indication of how close to the referent the new design is intended to 
be – though there is plenty of scope for ambiguity. But the scope of references to canonical 
elements can be unclear: is the comparison exact, or is the referent a placeholder for a broader 
class, in which case the intended space of possibilities for the new design is wider. In design 
conversations this can be extremely confusing for the recipient, who does not know the extent 
of the space or the role of the representative object; if the canonical element is not recognised 
as such, the specification by reference might be interpreted too narrowly. Conversely, how far 
does a reference to a category include what is typical rather than just what is common to all 
members. Total misunderstanding arises when one person includes an object into a space and 
others exclude it. 
4 The Nature of Ambiguity 
Ambiguity is created by the availability of alternative r ferents for words, symbols, and 
symbolic or deictic gestures [15]. What referents are avail ble depends on the originator’s 
understanding of languages and notational conventions, and their expectations of the 
recipient, as well as of the design situation [27]. But the role of prior context in design 
communication goes beyond the need for the recipient to rec gnise the graphic codes used in 
sketches and diagrams, and ascribe the intended referents to words and symbols. 
Representations of designs are abstractions in which aspects of the design are not fully 
specified. Understanding how much of what is not described is fixed, and what can be varied, 
is as essential as understanding the explicit content of a representation [3]. This applies even 
more so to verbal references to other designs, which are barely specified at all.  
Research on ambiguity in design communication has largely concentrated on sketches. 
Understanding the ambiguity of sketches is relevant not o ly for their parallels to similarity 
references, but also because sketches are often used in conju ction with verbal references in 
an attempt to disambiguate each other. As is well known, people don’t mean exactly what 
they draw. Roughness in sketches expresses lack of certainty, but the viewers often cannot 
distinguish between intended imprecision and poor drawing, or between a qualitative 
placeholder and a relatively exact depiction, or betwen a simple form drawn roughly and a 
more subtle form drawn more accurately [3, 28]. One sketch or drawing often stands for a 
whole space of possible designs, but the viewer and the creator cannot know whether they 
interpret this space in the same way. Idiosyncrasies and poor drawing in sketches and 
diagrams bias interpretation by others towards different c ral meanings, as well as towards 
different judgements of imprecision and provisionality.  
This is also well recognised in engineering companies. The head of new product development 
at a large UK engineering company has completely excluded sketches from communications 
with external people, because he is concerned about them forming wrong expectations from 
their interpretations of sketches. Instead of sketches they use CAD drawings for early external 
communication, where they draw the newly designed featurs and use parts of the old design 
partially stripped of detail as placeholders for their other newly designed parts. 
Some earlier discussions of imprecision, uncertainty and ambiguity in design communication 
[10, 16] lump all these together under ‘ambiguity’. This is confusing, and promotes the  
currently influential view that ambiguity (more narrowly defin d as the availability of more 
than one qualitatively distinct interpretation) is beneficial in design communication, and that 
aiming to use computer tools to create unambiguous descriptions of designs is a discredited 
enterprise; this we doubt [3]. However Minneman [10] argues that designers sometimes do 
exploit ambiguity. Nonetheless joint designing is very different from communication between 
activities; handing over ambiguous representations can cause severe problems [24, 4]. The 
view that ambiguity is beneficial in design communication is related to two doctrines. The 
first is that ambiguity facilitates creativity by enabling reinterpretation. Schön [29] views this 
as interacting with the sketches as in a conversation: the designers see more in their sketches 
than they put in when they draw them, and these insights drive further designing. The 
extensive body of research on how architects and other designers use sketches, has focused on 
how designers reinterpret elements of their sketches [30]. The other influential doctrine is that 
design is inherently social. One important contribution of sociologically oriented studies of 
design practice [10, 12, 27] is highlighting the role of ambiguity in providing negotiating 
space, which allows individual and group creativity to flourish. Henderson [27] puts it as: 
“Ambiguous communications provide an opportunity for designers to project and reflect – 
breathing room from rational concerns. Designers project a story onto suggestive fragments to 
make a whole, creating the shared understanding”. But the eff ct of ambiguous 
communication is rarely so clear cut in design – it can be very harmful [3]. It depends on the 
function of the design communication (see section 2) and the stage of the design process at 
which the ambiguous communication takes place.  
5 The Ambiguity of Similarity References 
Communicating by reference to other designs is a double edged swor . It is very quick, but 
the references can be harder to understand than people realis , and can bias creative thinking. 
But sometimes their imprecision and ambiguity can give design rs space for flexibility. The 
spaces of possible new designs afforded by references to other designs have a similar 
structure to those of afforded by sketches. Usually “like” doesn’t mean “exactly like”, so 
some flexibility is allowed in mapping the old design into the new situation – some aspects 
will usually have to be different to meet the constrain s of the current problem, and others will 
be free to vary to meet other needs. So how like is like? Similarity references are inherently 
ambiguous. What aspects of the referred to or sketched design are significant? How precisely 
are these aspects specified? Are some aspects intended as accurate detail while others are 
rough indicators? How committed is the speaker to the proposal? Some aspects of similarity 
utterances make them harder to interpret than sketches or written documentation. Like all 
utterances they are quick and fleeting. A quick reference i  a sentence can carry a huge 
amount of information including the reference point, the modification to it, and the history of 
change that they referenced design has gone through. Wit a sketch we have time to reflect 
about its uncertain nature and pick up the degree of uncertainty from the way it is drawn – 
people often confuse polished drawings with final design decisions. While verbal cues can 
signal imprecision or provisionality in analogous ways, uncertainty in a speaker's expression 
can be uncertainty about what they want to say, rathe  than an indication of the looseness with 
which it should be interpreted. When designers create and look at sketches, they are aware 
that they are looking at an incomplete representation; but when they specify elements of 
designs or outline negotiation positions though verbal references to other designs, they can be 
unaware that they are actively constructing interpretations based on background knowledge 
and assumptions that the other parties might not fully share. The need to query assumptions 
and ask for clarification can be less obvious.  
Another fundamental source of ambiguity is abstraction. A y form of abstract description, 
whether it is verbal, written or pictorial affords many more interpretations at a low level of 
detail. When somebody says the engines needs a fuel pump as an abstract statement, then this 
says very little about the fuel pump, what make, what size etc. The details are often filled in 
by  he listener from experience. A fuel pump might imply a certain make because it always 
does, or it could be the one used last time, but it could also be a logical placeholder for a 
certain functionality. Again this is often not clear to the listener, who might then fill in some 
details but not others according to their own experience.  
Similarity references can play a significant part in the generation of new ideas, because they 
allow a very fast exchange of imprecise or skeletal ideas. With the rich context of a similarity 
reference, people can very quickly pick up on a different f a ure of a design that they like. 
The influence of similarity references on creativity go deeper. Designers often get fixated on a 
certain type of solution and find it difficult to think of radically different solutions [31]. 
Designers encouraged to consider a source of inspiration for one aspect of the design can find 
it difficult to avoid thinking about it for another aspect of the design for which it is unhelpful. 
A reference to another design can help them to reframe the problem and think of a different 
type of solution. However problems can only be reframed this way within the range of 
existing designs. More radical solution either have to be introduced by analogy to other types 
of products, or derived from theoretical analysis. This is a potential problem in mature 
products, such as diesel engines, where there is little scope for improvement within 
established problem-solving approaches. The efficiency of similarity references depends a lot 
on how well the people know each other and how completely they share the concepts, 
techniques and examples with which they think about design – their object worlds [12]. On 
the other hand the more the members of a team share, the more they suffer from collective 
fixation. They are locked in their jointly created solution space and need outsiders to break it 
for them. Whether this is positive or negative overall depends on the nature of the product. 
We have observed very efficiently working knitwear design teams, who needed to bring in 
students or freelance designers to get new ideas; as well as engineering teams where designers 
communicate effortlessly and quickly through shared object references.  
6 Applications 
The general results in the body of this paper are the outcome of many individual observations 
in a variety of design contexts.  These range from fashion to complex electromechanical 
engineering.  The analysis of ambiguity and similarity in the design processes of these 
industries indicates some strengths and weaknesses of these processes as well as how they 
might be improved. 
The fashion industry demonstrates a strong reliance on similarity, whether creating garments 
in a fashionable style or drawing on inspiration from non-design sources such as natural 
phenomena or design sources from different domains.  This was observed in detail for the 
knitwear industry. Although similarity is used extensively, communication especially in the 
knitwear industry between designers and technicians (who realise prototype designs) is 
fraught with difficulties because of extensive ambiguity. The analysis based on the general 
results above indicates why communication between disparate teams of technicians and 
designers and even among collaborating designers is prone to break down.  In some cases this 
failure is because several parties do not share common interpretations for similar objects – 
similarity is used inappropriately.  Other cases of failure in communication come from 
problems in actually realising the similarity.  Then alternative interpretations or rough 
approximations are created, many of which are far away from initial intentions.  The key 
conclusions in this industry example are that (a) similarity (and ambiguity) is essential for 
inspiration; (b) ambiguity (and similarity) should be managed carefully if the whole design 
process is to deliver design intention to product. 
Another case from a highly contrasting domain confirms the usefulness of the analysis of 
similarity.  This is the design of diesel engines, a largely mature product.  Product 
development is driven by regulatory requirements.  The analysis applies to groups of design 
specialists in particular features and functions of the product.  These specialists are both inside 
the immediate company, in other divisions of the same company or in suppliers. Similarity of 
descriptions is widely used both at the broad conceptual leve and for functional parts.  
Similarity to existing and previous company designs as well as with competitors' engines is 
central to success of new designs in the market. Inspiration may be aided by ambiguity.  
However, ambiguity is generally avoided.  In communication with third parties and suppliers 
only CAD representations are used in our collaborating company.  Similarity although vital to 
these designers is used in a tightly controlled and analytic l way. Competitive advantage is 
gained by small customer oriented changes rather than new styles and major revamps of the 
product range as takes place in fashion. 
In both examples the double edged sword is clear.  Similarty is an effective mode of 
communication among designers but associated ambiguity needs to be managed closely.  This 
is especially true when communicating parties operate at different stages of design (eg 
knitwear designers and technicians) or when designers work in different contexts (eg 
designers and suppliers).  The analysis of the paper shows why communication interfaces, say 
between product designers and part suppliers, or between knitwear designers and technicians, 
are sensitive to misinterpretation through ambiguity whilst interfaces within a shared context 
can exploit similarities and common meanings.   
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